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Abstract
In planned economies, a Central Planning Authority (CPA) generally designs
a mechanism for efficient resource allocation.. Does the CPA bear a cost,
in terms of increased communication requirements, for ensuring that the
mechanism is also immune to strategic manipulation? This paper presents a
systematic analysis of such costs associated with implementation of the
Walrasian performance standard. It is shown that implementation of the
Walrasian standard can be carried out with no increment in communication
requirements. Moreover, feasible implementation need not always require a
1007. increase in communication requirements. This leads to the rejection
of two conjectures derived as generalizations of results in the literature.
In addition, as the number of properties that the CPA demands from a
mechanism increases, in general, so does the upper bound on communication
requirements. Some new methods of informational savings in mechanism
design are presented.
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1. MOTIVATION
In planned economies, efficient resource allocation is undertaken by a
Central Planning Authority (CPA) which designs an allocation mechanism for
the realization of a desired performance standard. Recent advances in the
theory of incentives provide numerous ways in which the CPA can overcome
the problems posed by the public unobservability of private information.
The widespread interest in incentive schemes — or implementation
mechanisms — derives from the fact that the costs of auditing individuals
and verifying their information are high enough to render any such attempt
infeasible. However, the bulk of the literature on incentives ignores the
costs of operating these mechanisms themselves, in terms of communication
requirements and computational complexity. In this paper, we present a
framework within which the communication costs of implementation mechanisms
can be systematically analyzed. We devise alternative menus of properties
desired of mechanisms that implement the Walrasian standard and establish
upper bounds on the communication requirements that guarantee the
satisfaction of these properties. The issue of computational complexity
(which is also more difficult to define) is deferred to future research.
Consider the problem that confronts the CPA in a typical exchange
economy. An enormously complex body of information about individual
preferences has to be transmitted for an efficient allocation of available
resources. Economists argue that the competitive (Walrasian) allocation
mechanism encodes the complex information into finite-dimensional signals,
and determines a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources. Given that the
CPA cannot verify the information transmitted by the agents, the
competitive mechanism can be manipulated by strategic reporting of
information. This raises the following questions: can the
Pareto-efficiency and information encoding properties of the competitive
mechanism be duplicated by sin "acceptable" mechanism that is also immune to
strategic play? Are there mechanisms with communication requirements
"close" to those of the competitive mechanism which satisfy some other
crucial properties as well? Depending on the CPA's constraints, different
properties will be used to define acceptability for a mechanism. In the
following paragraphs, we shall elaborate on these issues.
The large body of literature on implementation and, in particular, the
contributions of Hurwicz (1979a), Schmeidler (1980) and Hurwicz, Maskin and
Postlewaite (1984) assure us that the Walrasian performance standard can be
implemented, given certain interiority assumptions. "Implementation" is
distinct from "realization" in the following sense. A mechanism that
implements a given standard accounts for the possibility of strategic
behavior, whereas a mechanism that merely realizes the standard assumes
honest transmission of relevant information. Does the CPA have to pay a
price, in terms of more information being required from the agents, for
insisting on implementation as opposed to realization? Moreover, the CPA
may have several other demands on a mechanism. How does this price vary as
the number of properties desired of the mechanism varies? Channels of
communication with the CPA are generally limited and the abilities of both
humans and computers to process information are not boundless. These
considerations make it important to have a complete menu of the
communication costs associated with implementation mechanisms.
We suppose that the CPA asks the agents to send a message containing
some information. A natural measure of the communication requirements of a
mechanism is the size of the message space. For a Euclidean space, the
size is given by its dimensionality. This is a measure of the maximum
amount of information that the CPA must be prepared to process. In this
paper, our focus will be on the message space associated with the Walrasian
standard for several reasons: as mentioned earlier, realization of this
standard achieves Pareto-efficiency and requires a finite message space;
moreover, from the results of Hurwicz (1979b) and Thomson (1984) we know
that implementation of the Walrasian standard is a sufficient condition for
(partial) implementation of almost every implementable individually
rational and Pareto-efficient performance standard.
This brings us to the details of the properties that a mechanism may
satisfy. Obviously, we require that it should implement the Walrasian
standard, i.e. for every economy, the set of interior Walrasian allocations
must coincide with the set of equilibrium allocations of the mechanism.
The notion of "equilibrium" commonly used is that of Nash equilibrium.
However, a widely acceptable refinement of Nash equilibrium may also
suffice — in particular we shall explore the possibilities with
Pareto-undominated Nash equilibria. Thus, the CPA may have two versions of
the implementation property in mind: one that relies on this particular
refinement and the other which requires that the mechanism implement the
Walrasian standard regardless of which one of the two equilibrium concepts
is used by the agents.
If the class of admissible mechanisms were unrestricted, the
information encoding problem becomes trivial and our search would end
immediately. Since the Hurwicz-Schmeidler class of mechanisms use finite
dimensional message spaces, by the application of the inverse of a
space-filling mapping (such as the Peano mapping) any finite dimensional
space can be smuggled into a space which has at least the same
dimensionality as the competitive mechanism's message space. The original
data can be retrieved by applying the space-filling mapping.
Clearly, the problem becomes interesting only if some further
restrictions are imposed on the class of admissible mechanisms. The appeal
of the competitive mechanism lies in the fact that it encodes information
by relying on the ability of agents to perform basic economic calculations.
Artificial smuggling devices are simply mathematical tricks that are
generally beyond the reach of most agents and the CPA. Moreover, as
Marschak (1986) observes, the apparent cheapness of smuggled information is
illusory. In practice, a continuum of messages would have to be
approximated by a finite collection of messages, and a small mistake by an
agent could translate into a major error after unscrambling the signal.
These concerns have prompted the literature that identifies mechanisms
with minimal dimensionality (Hurwicz (1977), Mount and Reiter (1974) on
realization and Reichelstein and Reiter (1988) on implementation) to make
certain regularity assumptions on the mechanism. Reichelstein and Reiter
(1988) restrict their attention to mechanisms with smooth outcome
functions.
Our intent is somewhat different from the papers that identify minimal
dimensionality. We want to make up a list of properties and then ask what
is the upper bound on the size of the message space that guarantees
implementation of the Walrasian standard and satisfaction of the desired
properties. One such property is that of continuity of the outcome
function. We need to give ourselves the freedom of checking exactly how
sensitive the communication requirements are when we add continuity to our
list of desired properties. Hence, for our puposes, the continuity
restriction of Reichelstein and Reiter (1988) is much too strong a
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requirement for ruling out information smuggling per se. In fact, we shall
show that imposing such a strong restriction may prevent the CPA from
taking advantage of certain savings in terms of communication requirements.
We shall make a minimal restriction on the class of admissible
mechanisms: the CPA cannot include a space-filling mapping (or any other
smuggling device) as part of the specification of the mechanism. This
modest condition is completely justifiable in environments where the CPA is
aware that such devices will not work efficiently and it frees us from
making any other mathematical restrictions. Note that any encoding device
must be specified a priori by the CPA. If it were left to the agents to
decide on the encoding device, it would completely defeat the purpose since
the agents would then have to report a function to the CPA and their
messages would not be finite-dimensional.
Given this minimal requirement, the CPA can make certain other demands
on the mechanism, which typically relate to its outcome mapping. The
extent to which the CPA feels that these properties are necessary depends
on its assessment of the ability of the agents to exactly arrive at the
equilibrium of the mechanism. If the agents are known to be highly trained
or experienced professionals, then the CPA may not worry about mistakes
being made in the computation of best responses. In environments where
such mistakes cannot be ruled out, out-of-equilibrium properties of the
mechanism become important. We shall focus on the following properties of
outcome mappings: continuity, feasibility and single-valuedness.
The continuity condition ensures that small mistakes by the agents do
not lead to large changes in the outcome. Thus, in the event of small
perturbations of strategies, the outcomes do not stray far from the
equilibria. The feasibility condition guarantees that every outcome (both
in and out of equilibrium) is such that (a) no agent goes bankrupt, i.e. no
one is asked to give up more of a good than his/her endowment, and (b) the
total amount of goods allocated to agents does not exceed the aggregate
endowment. Finally, the singie-valuedness condition ensures that the
outcome mapping is a function and not a correspondence. This requirement
may seem rather peculiar in light of the fact it is typically always met in
gaime theory. In this paper, however, we shall also explore the
informational savings provided by mechanisms that are quasi-games, i.e.
those with outcome correspondences (see Thomson (1984)). The problem with
quasi-games is that an unambiguous definition of equilibrium is not
available. The set of equilibria could expand or contract depending on
whether the agents are pessimistic or optimistic about the selections made
from the correspondence. In this paper, however, the only mechanism that
does use an outcome correspondence has an unambiguous set of equilibria.
Our research strategy is as follows. We shall require that a
mechanism satisfy a list of properties and establish an upper bound on the
incremental communication requirements (relative to that of the competitive
mechanism). The arguments are in a constructive vein. In the general
theory on implementation, such a program for establishing upper bounds on
communication requirements was initiated by Saijo (1988). As may be
expected, to achieve informational savings, the details of the mechanism
may become rather complicated. We propose some new design methods and in
this sense we diverge from the literature. We introduce price specialists
who are the only agents who announce market prices. By restricting demands
such that they lie in the agent's budget set, we reduce the dimensionality
of the agent's demand announcement. Finally, we introduce the use of
quasi-games as implementation mechanisms with reduced communication
requirements. Moreover, the quasi-game employed has an unambiguous
equilibrium set.
To evaluate our findings and to provide some benchmarks, we formulate
two conjectures. These may be interpreted as generalizations of some
recent results that have been proved in the literature. The first one is
the Information-Incentives Trade-off Conjecture (IIT), which states that if
the CPA is simply interested in implementation (perhaps using some
refinement of Nash equilibrium) of the Walrasian standard, it must use a
mechanism whose communication requirements exceed those of the competitive
mechanism. The second one is the Doubling of Communication Requirements
(DCR), which states that if the CPA is interested in implementation (using
Nash equilibrium) of the Walrasian standard and maintaining feasibility, it
must use a mechanism whose communication requirements are at least double
those of the competitive mechanism.
These conjectures are motivated by the results reported in
Reichelstein and Reiter (1988) and Saijo (1986). Reichelstein and Reiter
(1988) show that the IIT conjecture is true if the equilibrium concept were
Nash and if the mechanism has a differentiable outcome function.
Saijo (1986) shows that if we are interested, a la Williams (1986), in
constructing a generic mechanism for the feasible implementation of all
Nash-implementable performance standards from a corresponding realization
mechanism, the dimensionality of the message space must, in general, be
doubled. In generic implementation mechanisms available in the literature
(Maskin (1977), McKelvey (1986), Saijo (1988)), each agent reports the
preferences of at least two agents. This immediately doubles the
communication requirements, since a revelation mechanism, where everybody
announces his/her own preferences, would realize any performance standard.
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In the context of feasible implementation of the Walrasian standard,
Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1984) and Postlewaite and Wettstein (1983)
also use at least double the competitive mechanism's message space.
In light of these observations, it is important to know whether they
can be extended to universal propositions and whether such increments in
communication requirements are always necessary. The IIT conjecture is a
natural one to make, whereas the DCR derives its interest from the
regularity with which such a doubling has occurred.
Our findings are rather optimistic: the conditions and framework
employed by the authors mentioned above conceal a happier result. Both the
conjectures that we had set up as benchmarks are untrue.
2. PRELIMINARIES
We consider a class of exchange economies with m (^ 2) goods and n (^
2) agents. N is the set of agents. Each i € N is fully characterized by a
pair <a , o) >, where a is agent Vs weak preference relation defined on IR
i i i +
and is assumed to be binary, reflexive, complete, transitive, and strictly
monotonic, and w € IR is agent Vs initial endowment. We assume that for
1 ++ °
the class of economies under consideration, o) is fixed and publicly
i
observable for all i € N.
Let 'R denote the domain of admissible preference relations for i and
i
let n = y 0) , In the sequel, for any variable x , we use x to denote
ix ) and X to denote [x ) . Let ;4 = {z 6 IR : Y z = Q}, A =
1 i€N -i J j€N\{i> + ^i€N 1 i
<z € r"": z :£ n> and Liz, a ) = {z' € r"": z a z'}.
i + i i i + i i i
Given (m, n), an economy is completely characterized by a profile of
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preferences a = (a ). . Correspondingly, the class of economies for a
I i€N
given (m, a) is ?? = x ?? . Our focus will be on the correspondence that
i€N i
associates with every economy the set of "constrained" perfectly
competitive allocations.
The constrained Walrasian performance standard is a correspondence W:
??-)-> >1 which satisfies the following:
Va € 1R, yz e Win.), 3p € A such that \/i € N, z € B (p) and B (p)
i i i
Q Liz, n, ), where A is the m - 1-dimensional unit simplex and B (p) = {z €
i i i
A : pz = po) } is Vs constrained budget set given a normalized price
vector p € A.
Let Win) = {z € A: In € ^ such that z € Win)}. We assume that for
all n, € Ji, Wi ) ^ 0. See Debreu (1959) for the underlying assumptions.
To realize Walrasian performance, the Central Planning Authority (CPA)
can apply the competitive allocation mechanism which is given by a triple
<M
, fx , ^ > where M = {(p, z) € A x /I: Vi € iV, pz = pu)} is a message
space, II : n -^ M is message correspondence where for all i e N, ii : IR ->
M^ is given by Lt^(a ) = Up, z) g A x R'": z & B ip) and B (p) Q Liz, a )
. & .7 r-j
J
t->
+ i i
^
i
^
i
c c c
and ^ : M ^ yl is an outcome function that projects every element of M on
A. Using the following conditions: ii) Y (z - w ) = 0, (ii) Vi g N, pz
= pw and (iii) zero degree homogeneity of demand, the dimensionality of
the "competitive" message space M , denoted dim(M ), is equal to nim - 1).
The competitive allocation mechanism realizes W, i.e.
Va € n, ^''iii'iri)) = Win).
The competitive allocation mechanism requires that the agents must
follow the prescribed rules of behavior and transmit information consistent
with the true privately observed preferences. However, the CPA, being
uninformed, cannot prevent the agents from manipulating the mechanism by
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reporting misleading information. To model such strategic behavior, we
model mechanisms as non-cooperative games. The strategy space of the game
corresponds to the message space of the associated mechanism. Next, we
shall define and discuss a generalization of the usual concept of a game.
A quasi-game, F is a triple <N, S, ^> where S = x S with S
denoting a i's strategy space and ^ = (C ) with ^.: S ->» r"* denoting Vs
(possibly multi-valued) outcome mapping. Let ^ (S , s ) = {z € IR : z. €
^ is , s ), for some s € S K
'
^1 i -i i i
Given a quasi-game T = <N, S, ^> played in an economy n. € 'R, a pair
(s, z) € S X R is a strict Nash equilibrium of F in a if ^(s) = z and
Vi
€ N, C (S . s ) c Liz, a ).
i I -i I
A quasi-game is a generalization of the usual concept of a game (see
Thomson (1984)) where the outcome mapping may be multi-valued. A game is,
therefore, a quasi-game whose outcome mapping is a function and not a
correspondence. Correspondingly, a Nash equilibrium is a strict Nash
equilibrium of a quasi-game with a single-valued outcome mapping.
Quasi-games have been used very infrequently in the literature. The
basic difficulty with them is that an appropriate equilibrium notion is
hard to define. The problem arises from the fact that any unilateral
revision in strategy may require a comparison of the status quo outcome
with a set of outcomes. In the absence of any clear domination of one over
the other, a best response calculation is not well defined. The concept of
strict Nash equilibrium was initially used by Otani and Sicilian (1982) and
Thomson (1984) for the purpose of studying the manipulability of
performance standards (which are correspondences, in general). This
concept essentially assumes that agents are optimistic, i.e. when they
evaluate the utility payoffs from the lists of outcomes generated by
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unilateral deviations, they simply look at the best outcome in the list. An
alternative definition of equilibrium weak Nash equilibrium (see Thomson
(1984)) could be given by making the assumption that agents are
pessimistic, i.e. they use the worst outcome in the list obtained from a
unilateral deviation to evaluate the deviation. Formally,
given a quasi-game F = <N, S, ^> played in an economy a € ??, a pair
(s, z) € S X IR is a weak Nash equilibrium of F in a if ^(s) = z and
Vi € A^, Vs' € S
,
[3z' € ^(s', s ) such that z' i Liz, a )] =» [3z" €
i i i i -i i
^ {s\ s ) such that z ^ Liz", a )].
^i i -i i
This definition yields a larger set of equilibria than the earlier
one. Thus, instead of a well-defined equilibrium set, we can define bounds
within which such a set should reside. This ambiguity has resulted in a
lack of application of quasi-games to mechanism design problems (though
Thomson (1983) and Chakravorti (1985) do so, the ambiguity is not
resolved).
In this paper, this ambiguity is dealt with. In the case of the
only mechanism that uses an outcome correspondence, the sets of both strict
and weak Nash equilibria coincide (See Remark 2). Hence, it suffices to
work with only one of these definitions.
Furthermore, we shall also consider a refinement of the set of strict
Nash equilibria to retain only those equilibria that are
Pareto-undominated. This is a natural refinement of the concept of Nash
equilibrium. Let EiF, a) c or'"" and E (F, n,) Q r"^" denote, respectively,
the projections on (R of the set of strict Nash equilibria and the set of
Pareto-undominated strict Nash equilibria of F in a. Except for the first
mechanism, for all the mechanisms presented in this paper, the sets of
Pareto-undominated strict Nash equilibria coincide with the sets of Nash
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equilibria. Moreover, for the first mechanism, the Pareto-dominance
restriction is especially natural since the only equilibrium allocation
that is rejected by this criterion is the initial endowment.
The task facing the CPA is that of finding a mechanism that mimics the
competitive allocation mechanism. In addition, there may be an additional
list of properties that the CPA may want to satisfy. Let ^ denote the
class of all admissible mechanisms. A quasi-game F belongs to ^ if it is
completely described by a triple <N, S, ^>. This precludes any
space-filling functions from being specified by the CPA. The following
properties of mechanisms will concern us. The following definitions assume
that a pair (m, n) is given.
PI (Nash-Implementation): Va e n, E(r, n,) = W(ri).
PI (Pareto-Undominated Nash-Implementation): Va € ??, E (T, n) = W(a).
P2 (Single-valuedness): T = <N, S, ^> is such that Vi € N, Vs e S, ^ (s) is
a singleton.
P3 (Continuity): T = <N, S, ^> is such that Vi € N, ^ is continuous.
P4 (Feasibility): T = <N, S, ^> is satisfies the following:
(i) Vi € N, \/s € S, yz € ^ is), z € r"^ and
(ii) Vi ^ N, \/s ^ S, "rfz € ^ (s), T (z - w ) :£ 0.
i ^i ^iSN i i
Note that, by strict monotonicity of preferences. Pi implies
Pareto-efficiency and, in the sequel, P2 and P3 will be used together and,
therefore, by continuity we mean continuity of a function. P4(ii) is
somewhat weaker than the balancedness condition of Hurwicz, Maskin and
Postlewaite (1984). We implicitly assume free disposability of resources.
Given a mechanism T = <A^, S, ^> with a Euclidean strategy space, let
dim(S) denote its dimensionality. Given an economy with m goods and n
agents, the incremental communication requirements, i.e. over and above
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that represented by dim(M ), is the informational cost of implementation,
denoted p(r, m, n) = dim(S) - dimCM^^).
Given these definitions, we shall set up some benchmarks by stating
two conjectures:
The Information-Incentives Trade-off Conjecture (IIT): For all (m, n)
*
^ (2, 2), if there exists a mechanism F € ^ that satisfies either PI or PI,
then p(F, m, n) > 0.
The Doubling of Communications Requirements Conjecture (OCR): For all
(m, n) i (2, 2), if there exists a mechanism F € § that satisfies PI and
P4, then piT, m, n) ^ dim(M*^).
3. RESULTS
In this section, we consider mechanisms satisfying different
combinations of the properties listed earlier. Then we check for upper
bounds on the incremental communication requirements that guarantee the
satisfaction of these properties.
The first result applies to situations in which the CPA is the least
demanding — all that is required of a mechanism is that it implement W
using some reasonable refinement of the equilibrium concept. It is shown
that a strategy space with the same dimensionality as the competitive
message space is sufficient. Subsequently, we investigate the sensitivity
of the measure of incremental communication requirements to the imposition
of additional demands on the mechanisms. The construction of the
mechanisms and the proofs of the following propositions are collected in
the final section.
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if
THEOREM 1: There exists a mechanism Fes satisfying PI such that p(T, m,
n) ^ 0.
THEOREM 2: There exists a mechanism F
€
^ satisfying PI, PI, P2 and P3 such
that p(r, m, n) ^ min {v € IN; (n - l)v ^ (m - 1)}, where IN = (1, 2, 3..J.
jf
THEOREM 3: Suppose n > 2. There exists a mechanism F e ^ satisfying PI,
PI, P2 and P4 such that p(r, m, n) ^ 3m + 2n - 9.
)f
THEOREM 4: Suppose n > 2. There exists a mechanism F 6 ^ satisfying PI,
PI, P2, P3 and P4 such that p(r, m, n) ^ 3m + 2n - 3.
4. CONCLUSION
The results of this paper are summarized in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Apart from the fact that we have established upper bounds on the
degree of communication requirements for Walrasian implementation schemes
satisfying different lists of properties, certain broad implications emerge
from these numbers. In general, the upper bound on incremental
communication requirements increases as the number of desired properties of
the mechanism increases. The bounds depend on the number of goods and the
number of agents in the economy. Moreover, as for the two benchmarks we
had set up in terms of the IIT and DCR conjectures, from the table it is
clear that neither of them is true. In other words, the pessimistic
findings of Reichelstein and Reiter (1988) and Saijo (1986) cannot be
generalized to universal propositions as given in the conjectures.
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Finally, as far as further extensions of this study are concerned,
more concrete conclusions can be drawn once the lower bounds, or minimal
dimensionality requirements, are established for the different cases
discussed here. As mentioned earlier, measures of computational complexity
should also be incorporated to give an complete idea of the "costs" of
achieving incentive compatibility.
5. MECHANISMS AND PROOFS
Proof of Theorem h Consider the following mechanism, denoted F :
Let T Q N be a sub-group of agents who are price specialists. \T\ =2.
Let X € R denote a vector of m - 1 goods consumed by i.
\/i e T, S = is: either s =p cAors = x € [R"'"^ Q r'^'K
i i i i I i +
Vi € N\T, S = {s : s = x € [R"'"^ Q IR"'"^
i I i i +
Vi € N, let C : R^~ X A ^ R'" be defined by pC {x , p) = pw , for all x e
r""~ and all p € A.
Vi € N, ^ : S -> R is given by the rules defined in Figure 1.
1
[Insert Figure 1 here]
REMARK 1: The strategy space for this mechanism is n(m - l)-dimensional
which is the same as that of M . Part of the strategy space reduction was
obtained by using only two agents to report prices. Moreover, the outcome
correspondence for F yields a set-valued outcome under Case 1. This
yields a reduction in strategy space since the agents in T do not have to
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announce both price and quantity. The CPA recommends a set of outcomes for
these agents. The quantities consumed by them is decided in an
equilibrium. Note that the mechanism is discontinuous and does not satisfy
feasibility. However, it does maintain individual feasibility and works
for two-agent economies as well. T will be used to prove the following
lemmata which in turn prove the theorem.
LEMMA 1: V/i € ^, Win) Q E^iT , a).
Proof of Lemma lj_ Choose a e ^ and z 6 Win). We need to show that z €
*
E (r , a). Consider s = ((s^ = p) , is = x ) ), where p € A is such
1 t ^ t€T J j j€N\T ^
that for all J € N\T, C, {x , p) = z and for all i € iV, z € B (p) Q Liz,
j j j i i
n, ). Since s satisfies Case 1, for all t € T, ^ is) = B (p) and for all J
i t t
e N\T, 6 (s) = z . Next, consider unilateral deviation by some i e N to s'
j J i
* s . There are two possibilities:
(i) Suppose i e T: There are two further possibilities depending on
whether Case 2 or Case 3 is applicable. Thus, 6 (s', s ) € {z' , u },
i i -i i i
where, by definition of Case 2, z* € B (p). By definition of W, B (p) u
i i i
{(j) ) c L(z, a ). Thus, £ is' , s ) € Liz, a ).
i i 1 i -i i
(ii)) Supppose i € N\T: There are two further possibilities depending
on whether Case 1 or Case 3 is applicable. Thus, $ (s', s ) e {z\ w },
i i -i i i
where, by definition of Case 2, z* € B (p). By definition of W , B (p) u
i i i
<a) ) Q. Liz, n, ). Thus, ^ (s', s ) € Liz, a ).
i i i i -i 1
We conclude that for all i € N,
€
(S , s ) Q Liz, n, ) and, by
1 i -i i
«
definition of W, z is Pareto-undominated. Therefore, z € E iF , a). m
1
LEMMA 2: V e ??, E^iV
, ) Q Wi ).
1
Proof of Lemma 2^ Choose n € 'R, z e E iT , n.) and s € S such that ^(s) =
z. We shall first establish that s could not have satisfied Case 2.
Suppose s satisfies Case 2. Without loss of generality, choose i € T such
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that s € A. By definition of Case 2, ^ (s) = 0. Consider s' e S such
1 i i i
that s* «S A. By construction, Case 3 applies and 6 (s', s ) = w > 0.
«
This contradicts the hypothesis that ^(s) e £ (F , a).
Suppose s satisfies Case 1. Thus, s has the following form: s = {{s
= p) , is = X ) ), where p € A and for all J e N\T, z = C ix , p) €^ t€T' j j j€N\T ^ ^ J J J
B ip). Choose i € N, z' € B ip) and s' € S such that C (s*, p) = z'.
j
'^
i 1
^
i i ^i 1 ^ i
Either Case 1 or Case 2 applies and ^ is' , s ) = z'. Thus, for all i € N,
i i -i i
»
B ip) Q ^ (S , s ). By definition, ^(s) € E (T , a) implies that for all
i i I -i 1
i e N, ^ is , s ) Q Liz, n. ]. Thus, we conclude that for all i € N, B ip)
^i i -i i i ^
Q Liz, ). By construction, for all j 6 N\T, z € B ip). In addition,
for all t € T, it must be the case that z e B ip). This follows from the
fact that z e A and that for all i e N, B ip) Q Liz, n. ). Thus, by
definition of W^, z € Win).
Finally, we consider the possibility that s satisfies Case 3. Thus,
*
^(s) = 0). If w «S Wia), then we can conclude that u) ^ E iV , n,). This
*
follows from the fact that w is Pareto-dominated by some z e E (f , n,) r\
Wia). By Lemma l, E iF , a) r\ Wia) * 0.
REMARK 2: The fact that we use the concept of strict Nash equilibrium is
not critical for our result. The set of strict Nash equilibria and that of
weak Nash equilibria would coincide for T . Observe that, by definition
the set of strict Nash equilibrium allocations is a subset of the set of
weak Nash equilibrium allocations. Thus, Lemma 1 would hold even if the
equilibrium concept were weakened. We can show that Lemma 2 would hold
also. First, if s is a weak Nash equilibrium, it must be true that s does
not satisfy Case 2 for the reasons given in the proof above. This follows
from the fact that when the agent i € T switches from s € A to s' ^ A,
i i
^,is\ s ) is a singleton. Second, if w «£ Wia), then w is not a weak Nash
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equilibrium, by the same argument of Pareto-dominance. Finally, if s
satisfies Case 1, a unilateral deviation by any i in N yields a unique
outcome. Therefore, the arguments given for this case, in the proof above,
apply.
Proof of Theorem 2: See Reichelstein and Reiter (1988).
Proof of Theorem 3i First, we shall consider the case where m > 2.
Consider the following mechanism, denoted F .
Let T Q N be a group of price specialists with | T | =3.
Vi € N, let < : r"""^ X A ^ R"" be defined by pC, {x , p) = pu for all
i + i i i
X € r"* and p € A.
1 +
^
\/i e T, S = is = is , s ): either (i) s € R , s € A with C (s ,
i i i i i + i i i
s^) € B (s^) or (ii) s^ e A and s^ € (0, 10]> Q {r"""^ x R'""^ u {r"" x RK
Vi
€ N\T, S = {s = is\ s^) € A X (0, 10]> c (r"* x R.
i i i i I
The following definitions shall simplify notation:
(Dl) We shall use the following convention for all s € S and all J €
N. We write
z.(s) =
J
C.(5 ,, s.)
J j J
if s € A
j
otherwise
2 2
(D2) Given that there exists J, k € T such that s. = s € A, define
a is) such that q is) = s = s .
j k
1 2 I(D3) s = is , s ) satisfies Property a\i if the following
-i k k k€N\<i} '
conditions hold:
(i) q is) is well defined and VJ e T\{i}, s = q is)
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(ii) Vj € N\{T u ii}}, s^ = 10 and
B(g*(s)) and VJ € N\{i}, z(s) € B (q*(s)).
(D4) Kis) = {k e N: Vj e N, Vs^ € (0, 10], s^ :£ s^>.
J k J
^: S -^ i4 is given by Figure 2.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
REMARK 3: The agents in T are price specialists. Each of them announces
either a 2(m - l)-dimensional vector or a (m + l)-dimensional vector. The
remaining agents announce a (m + l)-dimensional vector. Therefore, the
strategy space for each agent in T is no larger than max {2(m - 1), (m +
1)> = 2(m - 1) dimensions for m > 2. The strategy space of F for the case
where m > 2 is 6(m - 1) + (n - 3)(m + 1) = nim - 1) + 3m + 2n - 9. Also,
note that F satisfies feasibility and single-valuedness.
The mechanism F will be used to prove the following lemmata which, in
turn, prove the theorem for the case m > 2.
LEMMA 3: Let n. € 'R, z e ECF , a) and s € S such that ^(s) = z be given. Vi
e N, if s does not satisfy Property a\i, then L(z, a) = A.
Proof of Lemma 3^ Choose i e N. We shall show that if s does not
satisfy Property ali, then A Q ^{S, s ). Consider z' e A . To show
'
i i i -i i i
2 2
that z' € 6(S , s ), consider s' = (z', s' ) e S, where s' € (0, 10) and
i ^ i -1 I i i i i
for all J € N\{i} and all s^ € (0, 10], s'^ < s^ Since for all k € N,
j i J
Property a\k is not met after the change in Vs strategy, Case 2 applies.
Furthermore, since K{s' , s ) = {i}, either Case 2AA or Case 2B applies.
i -i
In either case, £ is' , s ) = z' . z e ECF , i) implies that ^ (S , s ) £
i I -i i 2 i i -i
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Liz, a ). Thus, for all i e N, A Q Liz, n. ). By definition, Liz, a ) S
i 1 i i
A. m
i
LEMMA 4: Va € 9?, Win) Q E^iT , a) Q EiT , n).
2 2
Proof of Lemma 4i Choose a € ^ and z € W(a). To show that z € E iV , a),
1 * 1
consider s = iis
, q is)) , (z , 10) ), where for all i € T, C is ,
i ^ i€T j j€N\T ^i i
q is)) = z and for all k € A^, z € B (g (s)) £ L(z, a ). s satisfies Case
1 k k k
2B. Therefore, ^is) = z. Consider unilateral deviation by some i e N to
1 2
s' = (s* , s* ) 6 S . There are two possibilities:
(i) z (s* , s ) = z . Since Case 2B applies, 6 (s*, s ) = z € Liz,
I i -i i i i -i i
(ii) z (s\ s ) * z . Since Case 1 applies, 6 (s', s ) € {z'(s',
i i -i 1 i i -i i I
s ), (j)). If the outcome is z is\ s ), then Case lA must have been
-i i i i -i
*
applied and z is\ s ) 6 B iq is)) Q Liz, n ). If the outcome is w , by
i i -i i i i
individual rationality of W, we have w € Liz, n ).
Thus, for all i € N, 6 (S , s ) £ L(z, a ) which implies that z €
i i -i i
*
Eir , a). By definition of W, z is Pareto-undominated. Thus, z € E (F ,
2 2
a).
LEMMA 5: Va e ^, E^(r , n,) Q EiT , n,) Q Win.).
2 2
Proof of Lemma 5j_ Choose a € Ji, z € EiT , a) and s & S such that ^is) = z.
By definition, E (F , a) £ £(r , a). We need to show that z € W^(a). We
2 2
examine the possibilities arising from the fact that any one of the two
cases could have occurred and the associated outcome rules were used to
obtain z.
(i) Suppose Case 1 had occurred: We can distinguish between two
possibilities:
Suppose Case lA had occurred: In this case, it must be true that there
exists i € N such that Kis) = {i}. This implies that for all J e N\{i},
21
s does not satisfy Property alj. By Lemma 3, for all J € N\{i}, Liz, a)
-J j
= A . Given strict monotonicity of preferences and \N\ > 2, there cannot
j
'
exist z e A satisfying this condition. By construction of T
,
£(s)
€ ^4.
2
Thus, Case lA could not have occurred.
Suppose Case IB had occurred: In this case ^(s) = w. We shall show
1 2
that u) € Win,). Let s = (s , s ). Observe that by definition of Case 1,
«
q is) is well-defined. Choose J € N. There are two possibilities:
(i-a) s does not satisfy Property alj, in which case, by Lemma 3,
-j
*
Liu), a) = A . Thus, trivially, B (q is)) Q Lio, a ).
*
(i-b) s satisfies Property alj. We shall show that B iq is)) Q Lio),
-j ' j
*
n ). First, we establish that B (g is)) Q € (S , s ). Choose z' €
j J j j -j j
* 2 2
B iq is)) and consider the strategy s' = iz\ s ), where s € (0, 10).
j J j J j
Observe that Kis\ s ) - {/>. Depending on whether or not (z', z is)) 6
j -j j -j
Wi'R), either Case 2B or Case lA applies. Hence, ^is\ s ) = z\
j j -j J
0)
€ £:(r , ri) implies that 6 (S , s ) Q L(w, a ). Thus, B iq is)) Q
2 ^ j j -j j j
Kw, a ).
Thus, we conclude that u> € Win).
(ii) Suppose Case 2 had occurred: There are two possibilities:
For all i
€ N, s does not satisfy Property <x\i: By Lemma 3, for all
-i '
i ^ N, Liz, n) = A. Given strict monotonicity of prefernces and \N\ > 2,
there exists no z € i4 satisfying this requirement. By construction of f
,
^is) e A. Therefore, this possibility cannot arise.
There exists i e N such that s satisfies Property a. I i; Observe that
-i '
* 12
q is) is well-defined. By definition of Cases 1 and 2, s = is , s ) must
be such that zis) e Wi'R). Thus, Case 2B applies and ^(s) = zis). Choose j
€ N. There are two possibilities:
(ii-a) s
.
does not satisfy Property a|j, in which case, by Lemma 3,
22
Lizis), a) = A. Thus, trivially, B (g is)) Q Lizis), a ).
*
(ii-b) s satisfies Property a I J. Choose z' e B [q is)) such that z'
-J
'
J j j
* z (s). Consider a unilateral deviation by j to s' = iz' , s' ) € S such
j j j j j
that s'^ € (0, 10). Observe that Kis' . s_ ) = {J}. Thus, Case lA applies
and C is\ s ) = z\ Thus, B (q (s)) S ^ (s , s ).
j j -j j j j J -J
zis) € Eir , n.) implies that 6 (S , s ) Q Lizis), a ). Therefore,
2
^
j j -j J
B iq is)) £ L(z(s), a). By definition of property a|j, for all J e N,
zis) € B iq is)). By definition of W^, z € Win). m
j j
Next, we turn to the case where m = 2, Consider the following game,
denoted T .
3
|iV| > 2.
Vi € N, let C: IR""'^ X a ^ R"" be defined by pC„ix , p) = po) for all
X e r'" and p € A.
i +
^
\Ji € N, S = {s = (x
, p ) e r"""^ X A: < (x , p ) e B (p )} c r"'"^ x
i i i i i i i i i
For all i e N, for all s = (x
, p ) € S, we write z is) = C ix
,
j ^j j€N i ^i i
^: S ^ /I is given by Figure 3.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
r is a modification of the mechanism for feasible implementation
given in Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1984, pp 63-64). The outcome
rules of the two mechanisms are exactly the same. The strategy space has
been reduced by requiring the agents to announce an (m - l)-dimensional
demand vector. For m = 2, the strategy space for f is nim - 1) + a.
Given n > 2, this does not exceed nim - 1) + 3m + 2n - 9. The proofs given
23
in Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1984) show that f Nash-implements and
Pareto-undominated Nash-implements W. m
Proof of Theorem 4^ Consider the following mechanism, denoted f :
4
Let T Q N be a sub-group of price specialists, with \T\ =3.
"rfi
€
T, S = {s = iz
, p , t) € A X A X IR^> £ R"" X R"""^ X R,
Vi € N\T, S = {s = iz , t) e A x R > S r"" x R.
i i i i i +
Vi € T, Vj, k e T\{i}, let a = {p - p f.
1 J K
if r a * 0,
Vi e T, let b =
1
Otherwise
Let p = Y b p .
»
Given p as defined above, s = {{z , p , t ) , {z , t ) ), for
i i i i€T i i i€N\T
all i € N, define 9 is ) to be the closest point to z such that 6 is ) e
i i i i i
*
B{p ).
Let y = <t € R : Vi e iV, t X t :£ 1 and ty t z ^
++ i ^l€N i i
m.
Let t = max cr^^^-
Vi € iV, Vs
€ S, ^ (s) = t t e (s ).
1 i i i
r is a modification of the mechanism given in Postlewaite and
Wettstein (1983). The strategy space has been reduced in T using price
specialists and the outcome function has been appropriately modified to
take account of this distinction between members of T and N\T. An
appropriate modification of the proof in Postlewaite and Wettstein (1983)
establishes that T Nash-implements and Pareto-undominated Nash-implements
W.
REMARK 4: The dimensionality of the strategy space of T is 6m + (n - 3)[m
24
+ 1) - Mm - 1) + 3m + 2n - 3. Moreover, it is continuous, feasible and
single-valued.
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TABLE 1: Upper bounds on p(r, m, n)
Upper Bound on pCf, m, n)
«
PI PI P2 P3 P4
+ - - - -
min {i^elN: (n-l)v 2: (m-1)} + + + + -
3m + 2n - 9 + + + - +
3m + 2n - 3 + + + + +
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FIGURE 1: The outcome mapping for f
Let s € S be given.
Case 1: (i) 3p € A such that \/t e T, s = p and (ii) 3z € A such that VJ €
N\T, s = X with (^{x
, p) = z € B (p).
J J J J J J
(
\/t € T, ^ is) = B (p) and Vj e iVXT, ^ (s) = < (x , p)
t t j j j
Case 2: (i) 3i € T and p € A such that s = p, and (ii) Vj € N\{i}, s = x
i j j
with < (x , p) € B (p).
J J j
For it} = T\{i}, ^ is) = ^{x , p) and Vk g NMt}, ^ (s) = 0.
Case 3: Otherwise
Vi 6 iV, ^ (s) = w .
i i
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FIGURE 2: The outcome mapping for f^
1 2
Let s = (s , s ) € S be given.
i i
Case 1: (i) -zis) i W{^) and (ii) 3i € N such that s satisfies Property
a I.
Case lA
(i) Kis) = {i> and (ii) z(s) € B iq is))
Case IB
Otherwise
^^(s) = zi:s),
VJ € NMO. ^ is) = " " ^^'^
n - 1
^(S) = Q
Case 2: Otherwise
Case 2A
z(s) ^ Win)
Case 2AA
3i e N such that K(s) = U)
Case 2AB
Otherwise
Case 2B
z(s) € M/^(^)
? (s) = z (s),
1 1
VJ € N\{i}, ^is) = ^ ~ ^^'^
^is) = 0> ^is) = z(s)
30
FIGURE 3: The outcome mapping for f^
Let s = {x
, p ) be given.
i ^l i€N ^
Case 1: 3i, j\ k € N such that p , p , p_ are distinct
i
Q
I I |z(s)| I
Case 2: (i) 3p € A such that "rfi e N, p = p and (ii) V z (s) = Q.
^(s) = z(s)
Case 3: (i) 3p € A and i e N such that Vj € A^\{i>, p =
j
p * p and (iil
pCt),
pz (s) i
i
z (s) ^ Q.
pO)
?.(s) =
—^ z (s).
1 pz (s) i
Q - C.<s)
Vj € N\{i), ^ (s) = '—
j n - 1
Case 4: Otherwise
^(s) = w
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